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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
DAVID E. HOWARD, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

vs.

Case No.

8697
TOWN OF NORTH SALT LAKE, a
municipal corporation of the State of
Defendant and Appellant.
Utah,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Since appeal was perfected in this case the respondent
David E. Howard has died. It is believed that this fact does
not affect the disposition of the appeal. The death is, however, suggested upon the record pursuant to Rule 25, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
This case involves a proceeding for the restriction of
the corporate limits of the appellant Town of North Salt
Lake taken under the provisions of Chapter 4, Title 10,
U. C. A. 1953. The appellant Town of North Salt Lake will
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be designated herein as the "Town". Respondents are real
property owners whose premises were disconnected from
the Town by decree of the trial court. They will be designated herein as "Respondents". Emphasis has been supplied.
The action was instituted July 15, 1955 by petition of
the Respondents. Two causes of action are included in the
petition. The first asserts the invalidity of an annexation
ordinance enacted by the Town on April 21, 1952. The
second prays that in the event the said ordinance is sustained, the territory particularly described be disconnected
from the Town for the reasons set forth in the petition.
The court below sustained the validity of the annexation ordinance. Under the second cause of action it made
detailed findings wherein, pursuant to the provisions of
Section 10-4-2, U. C. A. 1953, it found the allegations of the
petition to be true and that justice and equity required the
disconnection of the territory involved. Decree of disconnection was thereafter entered pursuant to the provisions
of said Chapter 4, Title 10.
The only issue presented on this appeal is whether
justice and equity require the disconnection. The Town
does not object to the findings of the trial court or assert
that such findings are not supported by the evidence. The
question presented should therefore be determined from a
consideration of the facts involved in the light of recognized
principles of justice and equity applicable under the controlling statute.
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3
STATEMENT OF FACTS
We deem it essential to a proper disposition of this
case that the facts be fully presented. Because we believe
the brief of appellant does not do so we will undertake to
set forth concisely all essential facts. In order to assist the
court we have also attached to this brief two maps, Exhibit
1, showing the Town area prior to the annexation of April
21, 1952, and the area covered by such annexation, and
Exhibit 2, showing the area of the Town after disconnection and the area disconnected by the decree of the trial
court. The Town has, since 1952, annexed certain additional
small areas of territory lying upon its easterly borders
which are not shown by these maps but which we believe
to be immaterial in the disposition of this case.
The record here is voluminous and difficult to follow
because of the order in which the evidence oral and documentary was introduced. On the issue presented on this
appeal there is, however, no serious dispute of the facts.
The trial court found upon all of the essential facts, which
findings are not here objected to by the Town. Record
references will therefore for the most part be to the findings of the court below. References to the Clerk's files will
be designated as "R." and to the transcript of the evidence
as "T. R."
The Town was organized in 1946. In 1950 it had a
population of some 255 persons. Its population at the time
of trial was estimated at approximately 1150 persons. At
the time of organization the Town embraced an area of
approximately 480 acres which extended along the main
highway between Salt Lake City and Ogden, the southerly
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boundary line of the Town being common with the northerly
boundary line of Salt Lake City. On April 21, 1952, the
Town enacted an ordinance of annexation whereby there
was brought into the Town an area substantially in excess
of 3440, acres including the territory here involved (R.
115-116).
Under the annexation of April, 1952, certain parcels
of land owned by Cudahy Packing Company, Salt Lake
Stock Yards, Hercules Powder Company and Atlas Powder
Company were excluded from the Town, forming an island
in the center of the territory involved embracing approximately 280 acres. This island area is likewise shown upon
the maps attached to this brief. The reasons which led the
Town to exclude the island area at the time of the annexation of the surrounding area are not disclosed (R. 115-116).
The effect upon the Powder Companies in creating such
island was to exclude the properties of Hercules and Atlas
from the Town while the properties of Illinois and Columbia
in the same area were annexed (T. R. 400-407).
In August, 1952, the respondent Howard and others
filed a petition in the District Court of Davis County, seeking disconnection from the Town of a portion of the territory annexed by the ordinance of April 21, 1952. Proceedings were taken pursuant to that petition and the District
Court entered a decree of disconnection in accordance with
the petition (R. 109-110). Thereafter, appeal was taken
by the Town to this court wherein two questions were presented, namely, (1) did the requisite number of real property owners join in the petition for disconnection, and (2)
did justice and equity require the disconnection. This court
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held against the petitioners on the first question and reversed.
The second question was not determined on the appeal.
Howard v. North Salt Lake, 3 Utah 2d 189, 281 P. 2d 216
(1955). In July, 1955, respondents filed a second petition
resulting in the judgment from which this appeal is taken.
By reference to the maps attached to this brief and
the large maps, plaintiffs' Exhibits A, B, C and D, it is
seen that the Town area as it was constituted after the
annexation of April 21, 1952, is bisected by the railroad
tracks of the Union Pacific and the Rio Grande. The tracks
of Rio Grande roughly divide the character of land in the
general area. Westerly of these tracks and extending to the
Jordan River the land is largely low, flat and swampy.
Easterly of these tracks the land slopes up to the Wasatch
Mountains. In this brief the easterly area will sometimes
be referred to as the upland, and the westerly area as the
low land (R. 115-116).
As will be seen from the attached maps and said Exhibits A, B, C and D, the southerly portion of the low land
was disconnected by the decree of the court below. The
disconnected territory embraces approximately 1300 acres.
It is bounded on the south by Salt Lake City and Salt Lake
County, on the east by the original westerly line of the
Town, on the west by the Jordan River, and on the north
by the line indicated on these maps. The disconnected territory has the same general physical characteristics as the
remainder of the low land. Near the Rio Grande tracks is
an area suitable for farming. The remainder of the area,
extending out to the Jordan River, is flat with high water
tables and may be covered in part with water in late winter
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or early spring. The disconnected territory as shown by
the aerial photograph, plaintiffs' Exhibit D, is cut through
with open and closed sewer lines and drainage ditches which
have been in operation for many years. Apart from the area
near the Rio Grande tracks, which is used for farming, the
remainder of the area so far as agricultural uses extend,
is suitable only for grazing purposes and has been so used
for many years by Bountiful Livestock Company. Adjoining the disconnected territory on the north is the Cudahy
Packing and Stock Yards area, which was excluded by the
annexation of April 21, 1952 (R. 115-116, 119).
The upland area is characterized by good drainage, and
soil suitable for homes, business and industrial establishments. It is now being used for these purposes. Within the
upland area practically all of the dwellings of the entire
Town are located (R. 115, 119-120, T. R. 1028-1044).
The disconnected territory at the time of trial was
owned by sixteen parties, all of whom joined in the petition
for severance, the principal owners being the respondent
Howard, Bountiful Livestock Company, Salt Lake City,
Portland Cement Company, Salt Lake Refining Company,
Salt Lake Pipe Line Company, Standard Oil Company of
California, Illinois Powder Company and Columbia Powder Company (R. 117-119).
There are no homes whatever upon the disconnected
territory and no persons reside thereon. Western States
Refining Company as seen by plaintiffs' Exhibit D has
three oil storage tanks upon the disconnected territory, its
plant and other facilities being within the Town. The oil
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refinery of Salt Lake Refining Company and its administrative offices together with certain structures and facilities of Salt Lake Pipe Line Company and Standard Oil
Company of California are all located on the disconnected
territory. Salt Lake Refining Company and Salt Lake Pipe
Line Company are subsidiaries of Standard Oil Company
of California. The Refining Company is engaged in the
operation of a large modern oil refinery and Salt Lake Pipe
Line Company is a carrier of petroleum and its products
by pipeline from points in Colorado to the refinery site and
from the refinery site to points and places in Idaho, Oregon
and Washington. Columbia Powder Company and Illinois
Powder Company have powder storage magazines located
on the northerly part of the disconnected territory. These
magazines must, of necessity, be located in isolated areas
removed from any other structures and have been located
by these companies and their predecessors and other companies in the general area for many years. Except for the
structures indicated, there are no buildings whatever upon
the disconnected territory, and this area except as a small
part thereof is occupied by the structures indicated, is flat,
swampy bottom land no different in essential characteristics today than it was fifty or more years ago. The upland
area, on the other hand, has been used for homesites ever
since the settlement of the general community and is being
built upon with homes, and business and industrial establishments and the population increase which has occurred
during the period since the organization of the Town has
taken place entirely upon the upland area (R. 120-122, T.
R. 757-768, 1028-1041).
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There are no sidewalks, curbs or gutters within the
disconnected territory. No part thereof has ever been
platted or subdivided for residential development. Two
principal highways traverse the area. An extension of
Redwood Road, sometimes referred to as the "Industrial
Highway" extends across the area in a generally northerly
and southerly direction. This is a state highway maintained
by the Utah State Road Commission. Near the northerly
side of the area is an east and west road known as "Cudahy
Lane". This road crosses the Industrial Highway. From
the point of such crossing westerly to the Jordan River
the road is graveled. From the point of such crossing easterly to U. S. Highway 91, it is hard surfaced. Within the
disconnected territory Cudahy Lane is maintained entirely
at the expense and with the equipment and manpower of
Davis County. A secondary road known as the "St. Joseph
Farm Road" extends from U. S. Highway 91 westerly to a
point where the sewer conduit of Salt Lake City is discharged into the open sewer canal. Within the area involved
this road is unsurfaced. It is used by Salt Lake City in
connection with the inspection of its sewer canal and to a
limited extent by Salt Lake Refining Company and by Salt
Lake Pipe Line Company and its employees. The appellant
Town owns no road building or maintaining equipment and
employs the equipment of Davis County or the State Road
Commission for the maintenance of streets within the
Town (R. 122).
Prior to 1948, there had for many years been no significant change or development in the use of the disconnected territory. It was then used for farming and grazing
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purposes and the storage of explosives in powder magazines.
In 1948, Standard Oil Company of California determined to
establish an oil refinery in the Salt Lake area, and its subsidiary Salt Lake Refining Company acquired for that purpose a tract of land embracing approximately 588 acres in
one contiguous parcel, about 468 acres of which is located
within the disconnected territory, the remainder being in
adjoining Salt Lake City. Portions of this tract have been
conveyed to and are now owned by Salt Lake Pipe Line
Company and Standard Oil Company of California. These
three companies constitute the principal industrial enterprises within the disconnected territory. Their plants and
facilities are located near the easterly side of such territory
in proximity to the trackage of The Denver and Rio Grande
Western Railroad Company. Salt Lake Refining Company,
in connection with the construction of its oil refinery and
in order to gain access to its premises, at its own expense
constructed a hard-surfaced road leading from the public
streets of Salt Lake City northerly to its administration
buildings and refinery plant. This road is maintained entirely at the expense of this Company and constitutes the
principal public access to its premises (R. 122-123).
The matter of an adequate water supply is of utmost
importance in the operation of a modern oil refinery. Large
quantities of water are consumed in oil refining operations
and an adequate supply and sufficient pressures are essential for fire protection purposes. Immediately following
the establishment of said plant site, Salt Lake Refining
Company undertook to investigate and determine the sources
of water supply which might be available to it in connec-
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tion with its refinery operations. Consideration was given
to obtaining this supply from underground sources which
proved to be unsatisfactory in quality and insufficient in
quantity. Consideration was also given to obtaining a water
supply from the Jordan River but this was determined to
be unfeasible at that time. This industry then considered
and is still considering the possibility of obtaining a water
supply from treated sewage if and when Salt Lake City
constructs sewage treatment plants, but no water is presently being obtained from this source. Salt Lake Refining
Company determined that the only feasible source of water
supply available in 1948 was from Salt Lake City. Arrangements were initially made in 1948 with Salt Lake City looking to the obtaining of a supply of water in a volume of
approximately 150 gallons per minute which was projected
to increase to a volume in a range of 300 to 500 gallons per
minute in three years. Arrangements were made whereby
the Refining Company advanced the funds to Salt Lake
City for the construction of a single water main to its property in Salt Lake City and at a later date further funds
were advanced by the Refining Company to Salt Lake City
whereby another water main was constructed enabling the
Refining Company to have a water supply furnished
through separate mains which would insure a water supply
through one main in the event the other might fail. The
expenditures made by the Refining Company to insure
water supply from Salt Lake City are in the amount of
approximately $150,000. That portion of this expenditure
which was advanced to Salt Lake City for the construction
of mains within its streets and outside the Refinery property was repaid to the Refining Company by crediting its
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water bills. The water demands of the Refining Company
and its water consumption from Salt Lake City are now in
the range of 1,000 gallons per minute. The Refining Company expects within a period of five years that its water
requirements will approximately double the present consumption. The water supply which is being furnished to
Salt Lake Refining Company from Salt Lake City is pursuant to arrangements whereby Salt Lake City may terminate such service if the requirements of its inhabitants
are such that insufficient water is available for the needs
of such inhabitants. In order to protect itself against the
eventuality that Salt Lake City may be unable to furnish
a sufficient water supply, Salt Lake Refining Company has
entered into firm contracts with Weber Basin Water Conservancy District for 700 acre feet per year of treated industrial water, 2000 acre feet per year of untreated industrial water and 400 acre feet per year of irrigation water.
The Refining Company will be obligated to pay said Conservancy District approximately $95,000 per year under
these commitments whether or not the Refining Company
uses any water whatever thereunder. The commitments of
Salt Lake Refining Company to the Weber Basin Water
Conservancy District are probably the largest commitments
made to that District by any industrial concern within Davis
County. None of the property owners of the disconnected
territory other than the Standard Oil Company affiliates
presently require a water supply, other than that available
on their respective premises (R. 123-125). Weber Basin
Water Conservancy District is empowered to sell water to
other industries in the disconnected territory should such
water be required ( T. R. 1233) .
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While Salt Lake Refining Company was engaged in
providing its water supply, the Town was undertaking to
provide water for its inhabitants in the upland area. The
Town was organized for that purpose. To this end the
Town acquired the water from certain small springs located
in Salt Lake City and has drilled two wells within the upland area. From these sources the Town now has sufficient
water supply to satisfy the requirements of the upland
area with some additional capacity for future growth, but
could not now supply the requirements of Salt Lake Refining Company. No water is being furnished by the Town
to any industry or person within the disconnected territory.
No request has been made for such water by any owner
within the disconnected territory and no extension of mains
has been made into this area by the Town (R. 125, T. R.
987).
The danger of fire is one of the greatest hazards encountered in connection with the operation of a modern oil
refinery. Salt Lake Refining Company has made provision
for fire protection within its refinery area by the construction of water storage facilities consisting of a steel tank
and cooling tower basins having a capacity in excess of one
million gallons, water mains and hydrants throughout the
Refinery, pumps for the creation of pressure and by the
purchase and maintenance of fire fighting equipment consisting of a fire engine, foam powder, some 5,000 feet of
211~ inch fire hose and smaller first-aid hoses throughout
the Refinery (R. 126-127).
In addition to providing this equipment, Salt Lake
Refining Company carries on a regular and well disciplined
training program among its employees for fighting refinery
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fires. This program of training is conducted for the reason
that refinery fires are different from fires of ordinary
combustible material and must be treated and combated in
accordance with well recognized methods of fighting such
fires (R. 126-127).
The Town has no fire fighting facilities. Fire protection from public facilities in the south Davis County area
is furnished by the Davis County Fire Department. The
Town pays Davis County a stipulated sum for each occasion
on which it is summoned to fight a fire within the limits
of the Town. The equipment and personnel of the Davis
County Fire Department would normally not be of substantial assistance in combating a fire within an oil refinery.
Several fires have occurred within the Salt Lake Refinery
premises which have been handled by the equipment of
Salt Lake Refining Company. Some fires have occurred
within the disconnected territory outside such Refinery
premises for which calls have been made and answered by
the Davis County Fire Department. The Town has not provided either personnel or equipment for the fighting of
such fires, and renders no fire protection to the disconnected
territory (R. 126-127). In June of 1954, the Town authorized a bond issue of $15,000.00 for a fire department, but
the bonds were never sold (T. R. 992).
The Town maintains a Marshal who works one shift
per day and who employs an assistant during certain periods. The duties and activities of this Marshal relate primarily to the policing of traffic on U. S. Highway 91 and
the protection of business establishments and dwellings of
the Town which are located in the area along or near this
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highway and easterly of the tracks of Rio Grande. The
Marshal makes one trip per shift along Cudahy Lane and
the Industrial Highway. The Industrial Highway is, however, regularly patrolled by the Utah State Highway Patrol
(R. 127-128, T. R. 1004). In May or June, 1955, the Marshal
was called by the Sheriff of Davis County to assist in connection with an incident when a shot was fired through a window at Salt Lake Refining Company. There is no evidence
that any officer of the Town has, except for this incident,
ever been within the Refinery premises (T. R. 1127, 825826) . The only arrests made by a police officer of the Town
within the disconnected territory have been in connection
with the issuance of traffic tickets on the Industrial Highway or Redwood Road (T. R. 1007). The Marshal does not
do any patrolling within the refinery area of Salt Lake
Refining Company. This area is under fence and the Company maintains guards at its gates to supervise the entrance and discharge of all persons into the Refining area
(R. 127-128). The Marshal does some patrolling around
the powder magazines of the powder companies herein referred to. However, such companies have never requested
any police protection from the Town and these magazines
are kept locked and are in an open area necessarily removed
from any other structures.
The Town has garbage collection for homes and business establishments within the upland area. The Town does
not, however, conduct any garbage collection and never has
conducted garbage collection within the disconnected territory. Salt Lake Refining Company at its expense engages
the services of a waste paper disposal company which re-
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moves garbage from the Refinery area and hauls the same
to the Salt Lake City Dump (T. R. 826).
The Town has a post office and a postmaster. This
post office is located outside the disconnected territory
easterly of the plant of Cudahy Packing Company. People
in surrounding communities use this post office. One of
the three largest customers of the post office is the Cudahy
Packing Plant which, as above shown, was excluded by the
Town and is not within its boundaries. In addition to the
Cudahy Packing Plant, concerns who have their offices in
the Stock Yards building and the Stock Yards area, likewise outside of the boundaries of the Town, are extensive
users of the post office. On the other hand, none of the
industrial concerns whose plants are located within the
disconnected area make any use whatever of this post office.
Their mail is obtained at the Salt Lake City Post Office
(R. 131, T. R. 830, 907-908).
There is evidence in the record that a bank has been
established within the limits of the Town. This bank is
located east of U. S. Highway 91 within the upland area,
and wholly outside the disconnected territory. It serves
people residing within this upland area of the Town and
adjacent unincorporated areas. There is no evidence that
the industrial concerns or any of the owners within the
disconnected territory use or employ these banking facilities (T. R. 1148-51).
There is a suggestion in appellant's brief that residents
of the Town have been offered a sewage disposal system.
The fact is that in 1955 bonds for a sewer system were
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authorized. In August, 1956, Templeton and Linke, an
engineering firm employed by the Town, issued a report
respecting a proposed sewer system. It was introduced in
evidence as defendant's Exhibit 16. None of the bonds have
been sold and no construction of any such system has been
undertaken (defendant's Exhibit 16).
Appellant states that the residents of the area are
benefited by services of the Town in mosquito abatement.
In the years 1953 and 1954 the Town appears to have expended for that purpose respectively the sums of $158.27
and $454.67. There is no evidence that these expenditures
were made within the disconnected territory. No funds for
that purpose have been expended by the Town since that
period (Defendant's Exhibit 18, Page 3). The reason for
the termination of such expenditures is that mosquito abatement in the area has, since 1954, and now is being carried
on by another governmental agency, namely, the Davis
County Mosquito Abatement District, and this function is
no longer performed by the Town (T. R. 1143-1144).
The Town has a small recreational area located in the
upland area entirely outside the disconnected territory. As
herein shown, however, there are no dwellings within the
disconnected territory, and no persons whatever reside
therein. There were at the time of trial 277 persons employed within the disconnected territory. They were working at the Salt Lake Refining Company and Salt Lake Pipe
Line Company. Of these 277 employees, only 2 resided
within the corporate limits of the Town (R. 130).
Based on 1956 tax valuations, after severance from
the Town of the disconnected territory, 78.61% of the
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assessed valuations within the remainder of the Town area
would be made up of industrial, commercial and public
utility properties (Plaintiffs' Exhibit II). This is the highest percentage which such properties bear to total assessed
valuation in any city or town in Davis County. The next
highest percentage which such properties bear to total
assessed valuation is found in the town of West Bountiful,
where the percentage is 77.73% (Plaintiffs' Exhibit KK).
The average of all of the cities and towns in Davis County
for the year 1956 shows that industrial, commercial and
public utility properties constitute 42.86% of the assessed
valuations of such municipalities (Plaintiffs' Exhibit KK).
If the appellant Town were to lose the assessed valuation
of all the property involved in this disconnection it would
be in a better position with respect to the balance between
residential and other classes of property than any other
city or town in Davis County (Plaintiffs' Exhibits II and
KK). If the area disconnected is retained in the Town,
based on 1956 valuations, 94.23% of its assessed valuation
would be made up of industrial, commercial and public utility properties (Plaintiffs' Exhibit KK). If there were no
disconnection of the territory involved, again based on 1956
valuations, this territory would be paying 61.86% of all of
the ad valorem taxes imposed by the Town (Plaintiffs'
Exhibit HH).
As herein shown, the disconnected territory is cut
through with sewer lines both open and closed, an oily sewer
canal which comes from the railroad and oil refining areas
in Salt Lake City, and an open drainage ditch leading from
the Stock Yards and Cudahy Packing Company area. There
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is some evidence in the record that Salt Lake Refining Company discharges fumes and odors into the atmosphere in
the Town area. This Refinery is but one of four oil refineries in the general Salt Lake industrial area. The open
sewer canal of Salt Lake City is a source of unpleasant
odors in the Town area. It is conceded that inasmuch as
Salt Lake City is going forward with its program for the
construction of a sewer disposal plant that it would not
be economically feasible to enclose this open sewer in a
conduit and the defendant Town has so agreed with Salt
Lake City (T. R. 1167). The packing plant of Cudahy Packing Company and the Stock Yards area and the slough near
the Cudahy Packing Plant and the open drain ditches leading from those areas likewise discharge fumes and odors
into the atmosphere. With respect to the Cudahy Ditch,
the Town Clerk in her testimony stated that: "The Cudahy
Ditch is really as bad if not worse than the sewer ditch"
(T. R. 1167). The situation with respect to the general packing plant and stock yards area is best described in the
words of counsel for the Town where he observed: "That's
a pretty stinking place all the way around there" (T. R.119091). This is the area which the Town, in the annexation
of April 21, 1952, elected to exclude from its boundaries.
The disconnected territory was zoned "Industrial" by the
Town. It is zoned in the same classification by Davis
County (R. 121).
Under the foregoing state of facts, the trial court found
that justice and equity required the severance from the
Town of the disconnected territory. We believe this result
is compelled by application of the principles which we shall
hereafter consider.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON
POINT I.
JUSTICE AND EQUITY REQUIRE THAT THE
TERRITORY INVOLVED BE DISCONNECTED
FROM THE TOWN.
(a) Oral Expressions or Opinions of the Trial
Court Are Not a Part of Its Decision. The
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment Alone
Are Looked To in Determining What the
Court Below Decided.
(b) No Direct or Special Benefit Was Received
by the Disconnected Area Resulting From
the Exercise of the Powers of the Town.
(c) The Future Growth and Expansion of the
Town Will Not Require the Disconnected Territory Nor Is It Necessary for the Use of the
Town.
(d) There Is No Interrelation or Dependency Between the Disconnected Territory and the
Town.
(e) The Health and Welfare of the Residents of
the Town Do Not Require that the Disconnected Territory Remain a Part of the Town.
(f) The Decided Cases Sustain the Disconnection.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
JUSTICE AND EQUITY REQUIRE THAT THE
TERRITORY INVOLVED BE DISCONNECTED
FROM THE TOWN.
(a) Oral Expressions or Opinions of the Trial
Court Are Not a Part of Its Decision. The
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment Alone
Are Looked To in Determining What the
Court Below Decided.
The Town in its brief sets forth in full the remarks of
the trial court made at the conclusion of the evidence and
the arguments of counsel. The detailed findings and conclusions thereafter entered by the trial court are not considered or objected to in appellant's brief. The brief appears to assume that such remarks constitute the decision
of the trial court. The law is otherwise. Rule 52 (a) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that in all actions
tried upon the facts without a jury the decision of the trial
court shall be embodied in its findings and conclusions. The
code provision from which the rule was adopted was to the
same effect. The findings and conclusions form the basis
of the judgment or decision. The observations of the court
at the conclusion of the trial or an opinion, if one be filed,
are not a part of the judgment or decision. See Fictor Mining Co. v. National Bank, 18 Utah 87, 55 Pac. 72.
While the remarks or opinion of the trial court may
sometimes be observed to ascertain the reason for a deci-
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sian they may not be looked at to determine what such court
found or decided. The findings, conclusions and judgment
of the trial court must be examined in making that determination. This court has repeatedly so held. See Grand Central Mining Co. v. Mammoth Mining Co., 29 Utah 490, 83
Pac. 648; Utah Commercial & Savings Bank v. Fox, 44 Utah
323, 140 Pac. 660; Miller v. Marks, 46 Utah 257, 148 Pac.
412; Headlund v. Daniels, 50 Utah 381, 167 Pac. 1170; Stevens & Wallis v. Golden Porphyry Mines Co., 81 Utah 414,
18 P. 2d 903; Thompson v. Anderson, 107 Utah 331, 153 P.
2d 665; and Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 185 P. 2d
264.
In pointing out the foregoing principles, we do not
mean to suggest that the oral observations of the court
quoted in appellant's brief are erroneous or in any manner
prejudicial. We simply desire to focus attention upon the
proposition that if there were error in the judgment appealed from we must look to the findings, conclusions and
judgment to find such error and not to the oral observations
which were made by the court below at the conclusion of
the evidence and the arguments of counsel.
(b) No Direct or Special Benefit Was Received
by the Disconnected Area Resulting From
the Exercise of the Powers of the Town.
It is at the outset, an elementary general proposition
that in the exercise of municipal powers some substantial
direct or special benefit must be conferred upon territory
within a town. Otherwise it is upon principle unjust and
inequitable that property within such territory should be
burdened with the taxes imposed by the municipality.
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Cities and towns are granted certain powers by the
legislature. Through the exercise of these powers they are
enabled to confer certain direct or special benefits upon
territory within their corporate limits. It is the conferring
of these benefits which must ultimately justify or require
the inclusion of territory within a town.
If these benefits are not substantially conferred then

general principles of justice and equity require that the
territory be relieved of the burdens imposed by the town.
The special benefits which a city or town may confer upon
territory within its limits relate to such matters as roads,
sidewalks, curbs and gutters, sewage facilities, water supply, police protection and fire protection.
Applying these principles to the facts in this case it
is seen that no direct or special benefits of any substantial
character were at the time of trial being conferred upon
the disconnected territory by the Town. At the risk of
redundancy these facts may be summarized as follows:
There are no homes or public buildings within the disconnected territory. No person resides therein. No part
of the area is platted for residential purposes and it is unlikely that any such development will occur within the foreseeable future. All residential development is occurring in
the upland area. There are no curbs, gutters or sidewalks
in the disconnected territory. The streets within the area
are maintained by Davis County, the State Road Commis..
sion, and in the case of Salt Lake Refining Company by
this industry at its own expense. The Town has no street
maintenance equipment.
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The Town does not furnish any water supply whatever to the disconnected territory. None of its mains or
facilities are constructed within such territory and the
Town has not undertaken or offered to render any such
service. It presently does not have capacity to provide water
for Salt Lake Refining Company. On the other hand, this
industry has at enormous expense undertaken to procure
its own water supply both from Salt Lake City and Weber
Basin Water Conservancy District. Other property owners
in the disconnected territory do not require water supply
other than that available on their own premises, although
Weber Basin Water Conservancy District is empowered to
furnish water within the disconnected territory.
The Town has no fire fighting equipment. It procures
fire protection from Davis County. Salt Lake Refining
Company has provided its own fire protection fighting
facilities. If other property owners in the disconnected
territory require fire protection it can be secured directly
from Davis County.
Police protection service rendered by the Town is limited to highway patrol and issuing of traffic tickets within
the disconnected territory. The Industrial Highway is the
principal highway through the area. It is regularly patrolled by the State Highway Patrol. Salt Lake Refining
Company provides its own guard service within its premises. Police protection to the disconnected territory is available from the County Sheriff of Davis County. No property
owner within the territory has requested police protection
from the Town.
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The Town collects no garbage within the disconnected
territory. Salt Lake Refining Company at its own expense
engages an independent garbage collection service. No
other property owner in the area requires garbage collection.
A post office is located in the Town outside the disconnected territory. Property owners whose plants are
located within the disconnected territory do not use such
post office. On the other hand, Cudahy Packing Company
whose plant area was excluded by the Town by the annexation is one of the three largest users of this post office and
companies whose offices are also within such excluded area
are likewise substantial users of this post office.
A bank has been located within the area. This is a
private enterprise, not a municipal function. The Town
could not perform this function or grant or deny the right
of the bank to do so. The location of this bank does not
appear to be a material fact here. Even if it were, there
is no evidence that it serves any property owner within
the disconnected territory.
The Town is not engaged in mosquito abatement. That
function is now being discharged by another governmental
agency. The Town has undertaken studies for a system of
sewage disposal but now has no such system.
Under these facts, how can a serious contention be
made that direct or special benefits of any substance have
been conferred by the Town upon the disconnected territory.
(c) The Future Growth and Expansion of the
Town vVill Not Require the Disconnected Ter-
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ritory Nor Is It Necessary for the Use of the
Town.
The principle has sometimes been stated that territory
should not be disconnected from a municipality if it is necessary for the future growth of such municipality.
In its findings (R. 128-130) the trial court found that
the growth and expansion of the Town did not require the
disconnected territory and that the same was not necessary
for the use of the Town.
This finding is not assailed in the brief of the Town
and it is supported by the evidence.
The physical facts alone are sufficient to demonstrate
this proposition. Here involved is an area of some 1300
acres lying at the very back door of Salt Lake City. Yet
in more than one hundred years after the settlement of the
surrounding communities there is not a single home or
dwelling located upon the disconnected territory. The only
structures whatever within this territory are the facilities
of the oil companies and the magazines of Illinois and
Columbia Powder. The witness Kiepe, a professional real
estate appraiser, in his testimony explained why this low,
swampy area had not developed and demonstrated that the
logical area for the development and expansion of residential construction lay in the upland territory (T. R. 1043).
Giving consideration to possible industrial expansion
the evidence shows that the industrial concerns which,
during the post-war period, have established plants in the
general area in question have located upon or adjacent to
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railroad trackage. The disconnected territory is owned
primarily by Salt Lake City, Bountiful Livestock Company,
Portland Cement Company and Salt Lake Refining Company. There is no evidence that any of these ownerships
will change within the foreseeable future and if further
industrial expansion occurs in the area embraced within
the corporate limits of the Town, the aerial photograph
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit D) clearly demonstrates that there is
ample area for such expansion northerly of the island area
and along and near the tracks of Rio Grande and Union
Pacific, and other evidence is to the same effect (T. R. 10361040).
It therefore appears quite clear that the future growth
and expansion of the Town will not require the disconnected
territory either for residential or industrial purposes.
(d) There Is No Interrelation or Dependency Between the Disconnected Territory and the
Town.
A disposition of this point requires an examination of
the Utah case of In re Chief Consolidated Mining Co., et al.,
71 Utah 430, 266 Pac. 1044 (1926), cited in the brief of
the Town.
In that case petitioner sought disconnection from
Mammoth City of an area of territory. Disconnection was
decreed by the trial court. On appeal this court, in a divided
opinion, reversed except as to a small area in the west part
of the Town.
On the facts the case is readily distinguished from the
one at bar. In the Mammoth City case the area involved was
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a part of the town upon its incorporation and had at all
times been within the town prior to the commencement of
the disconnection proceedings. Mammoth City was a mining
town. The court found that if there were no mines operated in the immediate vicinity the town would never have
existed. The municipality was organized for the sole purpose of providing homes for those who worked in and
about the mines located within the city and other mines
in the vicinity. A large percentage of the men residing in
Mammoth City were employees of the mines located within
the boundaries of the city. The mines located within the
boundaries of Mammoth City and the municipality itself
were entirely tied up together.
In the instant case, the development of the Town and
that of the disconnected territory have each been independent of the other. The disconnected territory was not made
a part of the Town upon its organization in 1946, but was
annexed by the ordinance of April 21, 1952. This annexation precipitated the litigation which has been in progress
ever since that time. The Town was organized primarily
for the purpose of providing its inhabitants with a water
supply and substantially all of the expenditures made by
the Town have been for that purpose (Defendant's Exhibit
16, Page 7). But no part of such expenditures have been
made within the disconnected territory and no part of such
water supply has been furnished to such territory.
While the Town was procuring its water supply, Salt
Lake Refining Company, the principal industry of the area,
was doing likewise. Substantial expenditures were made
by this Company to procure water from Salt Lake City and
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its commitments to the Weber Basin Water Conservancy
District is probably the largest commitment of any industrial concern in Davis County. While the Town relied and
now relies on Davis County for its fire protection, Salt Lake
Refining Company at its own expense provided its own.
Likewise this industry, wholly independent from the Town,
built its own road into its premises and at its own expense
maintains the same. It provides its own police protection
and pays and discharges the cost of collection of garbage
within its premises. Where in the Mammoth City case most
of the mine employees lived within the city, here out of 277
employees working in the disconnected territory only 2
reside in the Town. In the Mammoth City case the city was
dependent upon the mining premises for its existence. Here,
if the disconnected territory remains outside the Town,
78.61% of its assessed valuation, based on 1956 figures, will
nevertheless be made up of industrial, commercial and public
utility properties which is the highest percentage of such
properties in the assessed valuation of any city or town
within Davis County and compares with an average within
such categories for all cities and towns of Davis County
of only 42.86%.
Thus it is seen that not only is there actually no relationship or dependency between the disconnected territory
and the Town, but that the Town after severance of the
territory involved will receive a larger percentage of its
ad valorem tax revenues from industrial, commercial and
public utility properties than any other city or town in
Davis County.
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Moreover, the Town by the annexation of April 21,
1952, excluded from its boundaries the plant of Cudahy
Packing Company, the Stock Yards area and the plants of
Hercules Powder Company and Atlas Powder Company.
If there were any community of interest between industry
and the Town, it would be with these industries which are
located at the very heart of the Town area, and which as
the evidence shows are among the largest users of the Town
post office. On the other hand, the activities of the disconnected territory are related primarily to Salt Lake City.
From this municipality Salt Lake Refining Company has
in the past procured its water supply. The public access
road which this industry constructed and maintains at its
expense connects directly with the streets of Salt Lake City,
rather than with those of the Town. Its garbage is disposed
of in Salt Lake City, and from the Salt Lake City post office
both this Company and Salt Lake Pipe Line Company procure their mail.
Surely none of the essential facts which led to the decision in In re Chief Consolidated Mining Co., supra, are
here present and there is no interrelation or dependency
between the disconnected territory and the Town.
(e) The Health and Welfare of the Residents of
the Town Do Not Require that the Disconnected Territory Remain a Part of the Town.
There is some suggestion in the brief of the Town that
its inhabitants are subjected to odors and fumes emanating
from the plant of Salt Lake Refining Company. The evidence on that subject was produced by Freda Wood, Town
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Clerk of the Town, who, in response to a question of counsel, stated as follows: "Well, usually about two o'clock in
the morning they have some kind of a fume that comes out
of their smoke stacks that has a sulfury-choking effect.
It's usually noticeable more in the early hours of the morning than during the regular working hours, or easterly wind
is just blowing our way at that time. The Western States,
of course, also has quite a bit of polution. It would hit the
higher areas more so than where I live, from the Western
States Refinery, and the sewer ditch there. When there is
a west wind coming up there, it's very bad at that time"
(T. R. 1166-1167). The witness further stated: "We have
quite a variety of smells out there. It depends on who is
operating what" (T. R. 1166). And in the course of her testimony she spoke of the odors arising from the Cudahy Ditch
and the packing plant areas where, as indicated above, counsel observed : "That's a pretty stinking place all the way
around there."
Turning to a consideration of these fumes and odors it
is seen that they arise to a substantial degree from the open
sewer canal of Salt Lake City. It is conceded that nothing
can be done on this problem, pending the construction by
Salt Lake City of a sewage treatment plant and the Town
has so agreed (T. R. 1167).
The principal source of fumes and odors is the packing
plant--stock yards area and the Cudahy Ditch.
We do not intend in this brief to disparage the operations of the Cudahy Packing Company, the Stock Yards,
or any other industrial concern in the entire area under
consideration. The Cudahy Packing Plant and the Stock
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Yards have been located and operated in North Salt Lake
for many years, long prior to the organization of the Town.
The entire low land area wherein this plant and these yards
are located has been zoned industrial by Davis County, and
the Town has undertaken to classify the disconnected territory in the same manner. The operations of these concerns
are being conducted within such classification, and we believe in an entirely lawful manner. We mean simply to
point out that if the annexation of April 21, 1952, had in
good faith been made for the purpose of controlling fumes
and odors, the island area instead of being excluded would
necessarily have been annexed to the Town.
Considering the matter of oil refineries, there are four
in the general area. Utah Oil is south of the Town; Phillips
Petroleum is northerly of the Town; Western States is within the Town, while Salt Lake Refining is westerly of the
Town. If there be any air pollution from these industries,
the situation is general to the Salt Lake industrial area and
not related to any one refinery. There is no suggestion here
that any of such refineries are operating in an unlawful
manner; that the operations should be abated, restricted
or curtailed, or that any measures should be taken against
any of these industries by way of municipal regulation or
control. On the contrary, this protracted ligitation stems
primarily from the desire of the Town to keep this refinery
within its boundaries.
Nothing of any substance appears in this case which
would justify a trier of the fact in finding that the health
and welfare of the residents of the Town require retention
of the disconnected territory, and the court below so found.
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(f) The Decided Cases Sustain the Disconnection.
The brief of the appellant cites the two Kentucky case~
of Collins v. Town of Crittenden, 70 S. W. 183, and Park:
et al. v. Covington, 218 S. W. 986, and the South Dakota
case of England v. Rapid City, 40 N. W. 2d 399. In each of
these cases the lower court refused to decree disconnection
and the appellate court sustained the decree. The rule in
Kentucky appears to be that the findings of the trial court
will not be disturbed if sustained by the evidence and a similar rule appears to prevail in South Dakota. The Kentucky
statute provides that upon the requisite petition the territory shall be disconnected unless the court shall find from
the evidence that a failure to annex will materially retard
the prosperity of the town and of the owners and inhabitants of the territory involved. The South Dakota statute
provides that the disconnection shall be granted if the court
finds that it can be granted without injustice to the inhabitants or persons interested.
While the Kentucky and South Dakota statutes are not
involved here, and the decision of those courts is not controlling, an examination of the facts in each of those cases
will demonstrate that those cases are readily distinguishable
from the case at bar, and the decision of the trial court in
each case may be sustained by application of the principles
which we have heretofore considered and found to necessitate the disconnection of the territory involved in the case
at bar.
We have examined all the disconnection cases which
have come before this court under the statutes in question.
They are Young, et al. v. Salt Lake City, 24 Utah 321, 67
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Pac. 1066 (1902) ; Gilmor v. Dale, 27 Utah 372, 75 Pac. 932
(1904); In re Fulmer, 33 Utah 43, 92 Pac. 768 (1907) ;
Christensen v. Town of Clearfield, 66 Utah 455, 243 Pac.
376 (1926); In re Smithfield City, 70 Utah 564, 262 Pac.
105 (1927) ; In re Chief Consolidated Mining Company, et
al., supra (1926) ; Plutus Mining Company v. Orme, et al.,
76 Utah 286, 289 Pac. 132 (1930); In re Peterson, 87 Utah
144, 48 P. 2d 468 (1935) ; and Application of Peterson, 92
Utah 212, 66 P. 2d 1195 (1937) ; Howard v. North Salt
Lake, supra (1955).

ll

rt
I~

In Young v. Salt Lake City, supra, the trial court disconnected a parcel of land from Salt Lake City and this
court affirmed. The allegations of the petition which the
trial court found to be true were in substance that the land
in question was not platted for any municipal purpose and
was not situated so as to render it desirable to be platted
for residents or business purposes; that the same was no
part of the townsite entry of Salt Lake City; that it was
situated five miles from the business portion of the city
and two miles from the platted and inhabited part of the
same; that lying between said land and the city was the
Fort Douglas Military Reservation and the only way to
reach the land was over said Reservation; that most of the
property was situated north of Emigration Canyon along
the foothills and mountain side and was mountainous,
broken and unfit for residential purposes; that a range of
foothills lay between it and the Reservation and that the
land had never received or could receive any fire or police
protection or other municipal benefits.

ill

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

34

In Gilmor v. Dale, supra, a parcel of land had been
disconnected from Salt Lake City and the case involved an
action for the recovery of certain taxes paid under protest
which had been levied upon the disconnected territory. The
report does not disclose the allegations or findings of the
court in connection with the disconnection proceedings
which preceded the action for the recovery of the taxes paid
under protest.

In re Fulmer, supra, involved proceedings for the disconnection of certain territory from the town of Mapleton
in Utah County. The trial court decreed disconnection and
this court affirmed on the issue of justice and equity but
reversed for further proceedings to adjust the terms upon
which severance should be made. While the findings of
the trial court do not appear from the decision this court
in part stated : "The findings are amply supported by the
evidence and it is quite clear that all of the territory sought
to be detached consists of agricultural lands and receives
no direct or appreciable benefit from being within the corporate limits of the town of Mapleton."
Christensen v. Town of Clearfield, supra, involved proceedings to disconnect about 681 acres from the corporate
limits of Clearfield in Davis County. The area was segregated by the trial court and this court affirmed. Complaint
was made by the town that the findings of the trial court
were not supported by the evidence, which contention this
court held was not well founded. The contention was further made by the town that the disconnected territory received the same benefits as other premises within its boundaries. In affirming the decree, this court held that dis-
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connection was proper where no direct or appreciable benefit was received regardless of such objection.

In re Smithfield City, supra, presents a situation similar to the Clearfield case. Here the trial court disconnected
under a finding that the detached area received no direct
or appreciable benefit from being within the corporate limits of the town and this court affirmed, the finding being
based, as this court says, on amply supported evidence.
Plutus Mining Company v. Orme, et al., supra, grows
out of the case of In re Chief Consolidated Mining Co., et al.,
supra, and involves the question of the liability of disconnected territory for the payment of taxes during the period
of disconnection and prior to the reversal of judgment on
appeal. The question of justice and equity is not involved
in this case.
In re Peterson, and Application of Peterson, supra, involved proceedings for the disconnection of some 52.5 acres
of land from the corporate limits of the town of Moab. In
the first case, judgment was reversed by this court and the
cause remanded for further proceedings. The facts were
that the land in question was located on the western boundary of the town. The party seeking disconnection had himself joined in the incorporation of the town of Moab and
the inclusion therein of these premises which he sought
later to disconnect. The land was agricultural in character,
had never been used for any other purpose than to raise
hay and other farm products, it had no residence on it
except a small shack, the town had a sewer system and a
waterworks system, both of which were constructed since
the petition for severance was filed, the sewer was located
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at too high an elevation to serve the severed lands, city
water was available to the land but it could be more conveniently served from a privately owned system, the nearest water fire hydrant maintained by the town was about
a mile distant, the land was about a mile from the business
section of the town, there was no paving or sidewalk or
other improvements abutting or near the land although it
did abut on an abandoned state highway which was being
maintained by the town. Power and light services were
available but these were furnished by a private concern
and not by the town government. Disconnection was decreed by the trial court on the second hearing of the case
and affirmed on appeal, this court saying: "We are satisfied the findings of the trial court are sufficiently supported
by the evidence and that neither the findings nor the decree
should now be disturbed." The town contended that it
would lose its income theretofore derived from taxation of
the severed lands but this court held that this was not a
sufficient reason to defeat the disconnection.
In none of these cases where disconnection was decreed
were the elements of justice and equity stronger than in
the case at bar. Only in the Mamnwth City case (In re
Chief Consolidated Mining Company) was the decree of
disconnection reversed on the issue of justice and equity.
The facts in that case, as we have shown, are so essentially
different from those here presented, that the decision is not
in any way controlling.
So far as we are able to determine, only two states,
Utah and Nebraska presently have statutes containing the
"justice and equity" provisions. For this reason, we have
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not cited cases on this point from outside jurisdictions
other than Nebraska. A brief consideration of the Nebraska
cases may, however, be helpful.
The term "equity and justice" was construed in the
case of Bisenius v. City of Randolph, 82 Neb. 520, 118 N.
W. 127. This was an action to disconnect 200 acres of land
from the city having more than 1,000 and less than 5,000
population. The land was unplatted farm land and it was
alleged that it received no benefits in common with the
platted portion of defendant, and the land was retained in
the city for revenue purposes. The statute provided, if the
court find, "that justice and equity require such territory,
or any part thereof, be disconnected from such city or
territory, it shall enter a decree accordingly." The court
held the statute constitutional, citing Young v. Salt Lake
City and other cases, the statutes being essentially alike.
In defining the term "justice and equity", the court
says that the statutory section should be construed to mean
"that whenever unplatted lands within the boundaries of,
and adjacent to, the corporate limits of such city or village,
are so situated that they do not have that unity of interest
with the platted portion thereof (in the maintenance of
village government), justice and equity dictate that they
should be excluded therefrom."
In Kuebler v. City of Kearney, 151 Neb. 698, 39 N. W.
2d 415, the court says:
"When an action is brought, either under a
statute or at common law, to remove agricultural
lands from within the corporate limits of a city or
village, on the basis that justice and equity require
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that it be disconnected therefrom, it is sufficient to
show that the lands sought to be removed have no
unity or community of interest with such city or
village and receive few, if any, benefits by reason
thereof."
In Runyan v. Village of Ong, 154 Neb. 127, 47 N. W. 2d
97, the court found that the facts were substantially as
follows: Plaintiff's land was south of and adjoined the
railroad right of way on the north. It was bounded on the
west by a highway which is an extension of the main street
of the village. The buildings on the property were 1000
feet distant from any building in the direction of the village.
The land not occupied by buildings was used as pasture.
It was never platted or subdivided. The business section
of the village was north of the railroad. No place of business was south of the railroad. There were only three residences south of the railroad that were in the village limits
and these were all on an east and west road %, mile south
of the railroad. The population of the village was 190.
There was no reason to foresee any extended growth. There
was no tendency toward business or residence development
south of the railroad. There were many vacant lots in the
business section of the village and ample space for any contemplated residential needs. There was evidence that the
village had maintained the roads on the west and south of
plaintiff's tract in conjunction with the township. There
was a street light near the southwest corner of plaintiff's
tract and another near the northwest corner. Electric
energy was supplied to plaintiff's residence by the Consumers Public Power District. The village maintained a
volunteer fire department and a part time village marshal.
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The police and fire protection afforded was negligible. It
was plain from the record that the plaintiff's land received
no more benefits from such protection than did adjoining
agricultural lands not within the corporate limits of the
village. The village had no water or sewer systems. No
sidewalks has been built south of the tracks. The court said :
"We think the evidence shows that the plaintiff's tract is rural in character and that its location
makes it unfavorable for development as an integral
part of the village. The evidence clearly shows there
is no unity or community of interest between the
property and the village. We fail to find any evidence of any material benefit accruing to this land
by reason of its being within the village. Consequently we conclude that justice and equity require
that it be disconnected from the village. * * *"

Davidson v. City of Ravenna, 153 Neb. 652, 45 N. W.
2d 741, involved a tract of 27 acres lying in the northeast
corner of a city. It was used wholly for agricultural purposes except for one residence in the southwest corner. The
court said:

"* * * The residence property is connected
with the city water system and is furnished with
electric lights from the Consumers Public Power
District. The closest sewer line is one-half block
west of the west line of the Hughes tract, the residence being about 150 feet east of the west boundary. The closest fire hydrant is one block west of
the southwest corner of the property. There is no
street along the west side of the Hughes property except for a very short distance at the south end. There
is no demand for any part of the tract for residence
lots or other city purposes. There is no evidence of the
development or growth of the city in the general di-
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rection of this property. It is rural in character and
its location appears unfavorable to its development
as an integral part of the city. An examination of
all of the evidence, including the photographs taken
at various points on this acreage, convinces us that
there is no community of interest between the property and the city of Ravenna. While it is true that the
property is benefited by receiving the benefits of
city water and electric lights, this is not necessarily
a controlling factor. Other properties outside of the
corporate limits receive similar benefits. But, considered as a whole, justice and equity require that
the Hughes tract be disconnected from the city.

"* * * That part of the judgment denying
relief to the plaintiffs Hughes is reversed and the
cause remanded to the District Court with instructions to disconnect the Hughes property * * *
from the City of Ravenna."
In Village of Hartington v. Luge, et al., 33 Neb. 624, 50
N. W. 957, the village annexed certain lands and under a
statute brought an action against the landowners of the
area annexed to have the court confirm the annexation. It
was alleged that the annexation was made for the purposes
of protection from fire, preservation of health, order, and
cleanliness of said village and for the purpose of raising the
revenue or taxes to help defray the expenses of said village,
and that said ends would in justice and equity require the
annexation of said territory to said village. It was further
alleged that other material benefits and advantages besides
those mentioned would be derived from such annexation by
reason of said territory lying across and obstructing the
approach and egress of the public and the citizens of said
village to and from said village to the public highways ad-
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jacent to said territory. The statute provided that if the
court found that the territory would "receive material benefit by its annexation, or that justice and equity require such
annexation of said territory," then a decree should be made
accordingly. The trial court decreed annexation. The
Supreme Court reversed the same saying in part:

"* * * The facts stated in the petition do
not bring the case within the provisions of the statute. It does not appear that the property sought to
be annexed would be benefited in any manner whatever, nor that justice and equity require such annexation. The principal benefit would be to the village by adding to the taxable property therein, but
this, of itself, is not sufficient. If this action could
be sustained upon the facts pleaded and proved, then
the village might annex a whole township or county,
as such an annexation could be placed upon the same
grounds as it is sought to predicate this action upon.
* * * It is not the policy of the law to bring
large tracts of agricultural land within a municipal
corporation. In fact there is an inconsistency in doing so. The territory of a municipal corporation is
ordinarily subdivided into lots and blocks, and the
residents thereon are not supposed to obtain a livelihood by the cultivation of the soil. Where it is
necessary, therefore, to extend the village limits to
obtain more lots or land that should be divided into
lots, an action of this kind may be sustained. But
it cannot be sustained unless the statutory grounds
exist."
The foregoing Utah and Nebraska decisions set forth
the principles which should guide and control a trial court
in the determination of the issue of justice and equity under
our statute. These principles, we believe, are all embodied
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in the propositions which we have considered under the
foregoing subdivisions of this brief. They constitute the
foundation upon which the findings of the trial court were
made. These findings are fully supported by the evidence
and sustain the conclusions and decree of disconnection.

CONCLUSION
The facts in this case demonstrate that no direct or
special benefit of any substance was received by the disconnected territory by the exercise of the powers of the
Town; that the future growth and expansion of the Town
will not require the disconnected territory nor is it necessary for the use of the Town ; that there is no interrelation
or dependency between the disconnected territory and the
Town; and that the health and welfare of the residents of
the Town do not require that the disconnected territory
remain a part of the Town.
The trial court in hearings had before two judges has
twice found that justice and equity require the severance.
The decided cases sustain this result.
If the disconnection is denied the territory involved
will be required, on a basis of 1956 valuations, to pay
61.86% of all ad valorem taxes imposed by the Town. This
fact compels the conclusion of the trial court that the resistance of the Town to the disconnection of the territory involved stems from a desire for revenue. This is not enough
to justify the annexation. See In re Peterson, supra; Appli-
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cation of Peterson, supra; McKeon v. Council Bluffs (Iowa),
221 N. W. 351, Anno: 62 A. L. R. 1041.
Respectfully submitted,
WESLEY G. HOWELL,
HOMER HOLMGREN,
Assistant City Attorney,
Salt Lake City Corporation,
S. N. CORNWALL,
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
& McCARTHY,
Attorneys for
Plaintiffs and Respondents.
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